Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
Table of Contents
Smith's Criminal Case Compendium
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This compendium includes significant criminal cases by the U.S. Supreme Court & N.C. appellate courts, Nov. 2008 – Present. Selected 4th Circuit cases also are included.
Jessica Smith prepared case summaries Nov. 2008-June 4, 2019; later summaries are prepared by other School staff.
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In this Wake County case, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision vacating defendant’s conviction for second-degree rape due to a fatal defect in the indictment. The Court held that a defect in an indictment does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction unless the indictment wholly fails to allege a crime.
In November of 2017, the victim, a college student home for thanksgiving break, went out in downtown Raleigh with her friends and became intoxicated. At some point during the night, the victim blacked out, and woke up in defendant’s car with him on top of her. Defendant was subsequently convicted of second-degree forcible rape and first-degree kidnapping. On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the second-degree forcible rape charge because the indictment did not allege that defendant knew or should have known that the victim was physically helpless at the time of the act. The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated the rape conviction, holding that the indictment failed to allege an essential element of the crime.
Taking up the State’s petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court first gave a broad historical overview of the jurisdictional indictment rule, beginning with common law and walking through North Carolina constitutional and statutory provisions. The Court ultimately concluded that “[o]ur Constitution and General Statutes, not an indictment, confer the general courts of justice with jurisdiction over criminal laws and the defendants accused of violating such laws.” Slip Op. at 40. Having established that constitutional or statutory defects do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, the Court explained that “[a]s these species of errors in a charging document are not jurisdictional, a defendant seeking relief must demonstrate not only that such an error occurred, but also that such error was prejudicial.” Id. at 42. The Court pointed to G.S. 15A-1443 for the appropriate prejudicial error tests.
The Court then examined the indictment at issue in this case, concluding that “[a] plain reading of [G.S.] 15-144.1(c) demonstrates that the indictment here clearly alleged a crime and was not required to allege actual or constructive knowledge of the victim’s physical helplessness.” Id. at 46. Here the Court noted that the language used in the indictment was simply a modern version of the short-form indictment language, and concluded that the indictment was not deficient.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the conclusion that the indictment in this case was not deficient, but dissented from the holding “that constitutional and statutory defects in an indictment are non-jurisdictional” and provided a lengthy dissent supporting this argument. Id. at 49.
In this Mecklenburg County case, the Supreme Court reversed the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion vacating defendant’s conviction for sexual battery. The Court applied the holding in State v. Singleton when determining that the failure of the indictment to allege defendant used force during the sexual battery did not make the indictment invalid.
In January of 2016, the victim celebrated her birthday by going to a massage therapist in Charlotte. During the massage, the therapist digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina. Defendant was subsequently convicted of sexual battery and appealed. At the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment omitted that his act was committed “by force.” The Court of Appeals agreed, determining G.S. 14-27.33 required the indictment to allege the act was committed by force and against the will of another.
The Supreme Court accepted the State’s petition for discretionary review, and the Court took the opportunity to apply the reasoning from Singleton that the defendant must show “that the indictment contained a statutory or constitutional defect and that such error was prejudicial.” Slip Op. at 6. Walking through the analysis, the Court noted that in the juvenile case In re J.U., 384 N.C. 618 (2023), the Court held the element of force was inferable from the allegation that the act was nonconsensual. This led the Court to conclude “[t]he element of force is inferable from the language of the indictment such that a person of common understanding might know what was intended” and that the indictment was facially valid. Slip Op. at 9.
Justice Earls, joined by Justice Riggs, concurred in the result by separate opinion and explained that the Court’s precedent in In re J.U. and Singleton bound her to concur in the result. Id. at 10.
The defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of first-degree statutory sex offense and two counts of indecent liberties in Union County. The convictions were affirmed on appeal, but the North Carolina Supreme Court found an error with the sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive 300-month minimum sentences for the sex offenses and arrested judgment on the indecent liberties convictions. The defendant again appealed, arguing that one of the indictments for each charge were defective. This argument was preserved despite the defendant’s failure to raise the issue earlier, as jurisdictional challenges to the validity of an indictment may be raised at any time.
Two separate indictments were issued charging the defendant with the sex offenses using identical language under one file number and two indictments for indecent liberties similarly used identical charging language under another file number. According to the defendant, the identical language in each set of indictments could have been duplicate originals and not separate offenses. The court rejected this argument. Both sets of indictments properly charged separate offenses in compliance with the requirements for short-form indictments under G.S. 15-144.2(b) (essentials of bill for sex offense) and under G.S. 15A-924 (contents of pleadings). The offenses were also properly joined for trial pursuant G.S. 15A-926 (joinder of offenses and defendants). That statute allows the State to join offenses under a single indictment but does not require it to do so. In the words of the court:
Defendant asks this Court to adopt a new rule by holding that, when read together, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-926(a) bar the State from using multiple short-form indictments charging the same offense with the same file number. We decline to so hold. Helms Slip op. at 8.
The case was therefore affirmed.
A short form indictment charging the defendant with attempted first degree murder was defective. The indictment failed to allege that the defendant acted with “malice aforethought” as required by G.S. 15-144 (short form murder indictment). The court remanded for entry of judgment on the lesser of voluntary manslaughter.
Short-form murder indictment put the defendant on notice that the State might proceed on a theory of felony-murder.
The trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s request to submit the lesser offense of assault on a female when the defendant was charged with rape using the statutory short form indictment. The defense to rape was consent. The defendant argued on appeal that the jury could have found that the rape was consensual but that an assault on a female had occurred. The court rejected that argument reasoning that the acts that the defendant offered in support of assault on a female occurred separately from those constituting rape.