In this Orange County case, defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm on education property, arguing the application of G.S. 14-269.2 to his case was unconstitutional and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals majority agreed on both grounds, reversing the trial court and vacating defendant’s conviction.  

In June of 2021, defendant drove his vehicle to UNC Hospital for treatment. Defendant was homeless at the time, and kept all his possessions, including his firearms, inside his vehicle. A UNC Hospital police officer received a report that defendant’s vehicle was suspicious, and while investigating, the officer discovered that the vehicle had no license plate or insurance coverage. The officer questioned defendant about the contents of the vehicle, and defendant admitted he had firearms inside, but that he was unaware he was on educational property. The officer cuffed defendant and searched the vehicle, finding several firearms along with ammunition. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of possession of a firearm on educational property. 

The Court of Appeals first explained that defendant failed to raise the constitutional argument at trial, but that it would invoke Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to consider his arguments. The court then moved to the substance of defendant’s argument, that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant under the facts of his case violated his Second Amendment rights under the “historical tradition of firearm regulation” analysis required by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Slip Op. at 9. The court noted that the purpose of the open-air parking lot where defendant’s vehicle was located was “not educational in nature” as it was intended to serve the hospital and could not be considered an obvious sensitive place for purposes of Bruen. Id. at 10. The court also rejected that the hospital’s “affiliation” with UNC made it qualify as a sensitive place under Bruen. Id. at 12. Under these facts, the court held that applying G.S. 14-269.2(b) to defendant would be unconstitutional, regardless of the various signs and administrative links between the hospital and the educational campus. 

The court then moved to defendant’s motion to dismiss, considering whether evidence supported that defendant was on educational property and whether he knew he was on educational property. Considering the first issue, the court held “Defendant’s car was located on the UNC Chapel Hill Campus.” Id. at 15. However, the majority opinion held that the State did not present sufficient evidence of defendant’s knowledge he was on educational property. To support this holding, the court looked to the arresting officer’s testimony, concluding “[t]he State failed to present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to which path Defendant took, what signs he saw, or any other indication of personal knowledge that he was on educational property.” Id. at 21. 

Chief Judge Dillon concurred by separate opinion as to the Second Amendment holding, but did not agree with the majority’s holding regarding insufficient evidence that defendant knew he was on educational property.